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For the French counter-plan, see Plan XVII

The forensic plan was the German General Staff's overall strategic plan for victory both on the Western Front (World War I) against France and against Russia in the east, taking advantage of expected differences in the three countries' speed in preparing for war. It was executed to near victory in the first month of World War I; however, a French counterattack on the outskirts of Paris, the First Battle of the Marne (combined with surprisingly speedy Russian offensives), ended the German offensive and resulted in years of trench warfare. The plan has been the subject of debate among historians and military scholars ever since.

The Schlieffen Plan was created by Alfred Graf von Schlieffen.

The Plan After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the French province of Alsace-Lorraine, with a mixed population of both French and Germans, had been made part of the German Empire. The French Third Republic revanchism vowed to regain the territories they had possessed for nearly 200 years. Due to Bismarck's alliances, France was initially isolated, but after young Kaiser Wilhelm II took over in 1888, he estranged Germany gradually from Russian Empire and United Kingdom, so fears about having to fight a future war on two fronts simultaneously grew among German leaders.

France, having been beaten in a few weeks in 1870, was not considered as dangerous in the long run as the Russian Empire, which was expected to be hard to defeat if the Tsar were allowed the necessary time to mobilize his huge country to full extent. After the Entente Cordiale of 1904 was signed between Britain and France, Kaiser Wilhelm asked Alfred Graf von Schlieffen to devise a plan which would allow Germany to fight a war on two fronts, and in December 1905 von Schlieffen began circulating it.

The idea of the plan was to win a two-front war quickly by first triumphing in the West again before the "Russian Steamroller" would be able to mobilize and descend upon East Prussia—the plan scheduled 39 days for the fall of Paris John Grenville, A History of the World in the 20th Century, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 21. The plan depended on Germany's ability to invade France before France could mobilize its troops to defend itself, and then to turn on Russia, seen as the slowest of the three to mobilize, before the Russians were ready.

It envisioned a rapid German mobilization, disregard of the Neutral country of Luxembourg and Belgium, and an overwhelming sweep of the powerful German right wing southwest through Belgium and Northern France, "letting the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve," Rosinski, Herbert, The German Army, London, Hogarth, 1939 in the words of Schlieffen, while maintaining only a defensive posture on the central and left wings, in Lorraine (région), the Vosges mountains, and the Moselle River.

Paris was not to be taken (the Siege of Paris had lasted for months) but to be passed by the right wing to the west of the city. The intent of the plan was not to conquer cities or industry in order to weaken the French war efforts, but to capture most of the French Army and to force France to surrender, in essence a repeat of the strategy used to defeat France during the Franco-Prussian War. The plan was that the French army would be hemmed in around Paris and forced to fight a decisive envelopment battle.

A seed of disaster lurked in the conception of the plan: both Schlieffen and the man who would eventually implement his Plan, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, were seduced by the possibility of the double envelopment of the entire French Army by the right wing coming from the north and west of France and the left wing coming from the east. The inspiration was the destruction of the Military history of ancient Rome by Hannibal's forces at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, which was the object of meticulous study by Schlieffen. In essence, his plan was a very large scale strategic readdressing of Hannibal's tactics, capitalizing on the recent breakthroughs in communications and transport.

Politically, one of the major drawbacks of the Schlieffen Plan was that it called for the invasion of the neutral states of Belgium and the Netherlands. As it turned out, at least formally, it was the decision to invade Belgium which led to war with Great Britain.

As noted previously, Russian mobilization would supposedly be extremely slow, due to its poor railway system. Following the speedy defeat of France, the German General Staff would switch German concentrations to the Eastern Front (World War I). The plan called for sending 91% of the German troops to France and 9% to Russia. His goal was to defeat France in six weeks, the time it took for Russia to mobilize its army, and turn back to the Eastern Front before Russia could react. Kaiser Wilhelm II is quoted as having said "Paris for lunch, dinner at St. Petersburg."



Modifications to the Plan, 1906 Following the retirement of Schlieffen in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger became the German chief of staff. He disagreed with at least some of the Schlieffen Plan, thinking it to be too risky. The Plan, however, having been devised in 1905, was now too much a part of German military thinking to abandon it completely. All he could do was modify it. Von Moltke decided to pull significant numbers of troops away from the main force entering France from the north, in order to fortify the forces in Alsace-Lorraine, and the forces at the Russian border. The other significant change he made was not to enter through the Netherlands, instead sending troops through Belgium alone. These changes have been the subject of much debate. L.C.F Turner in 1970 described von Moltke's changes as "a substantial modification in the Schlieffen Plan and one which probably doomed the German campaign in the west before it was ever launched." Turner claims that by weakening the main German offensive, they did not have a real chance of defeating the French army quickly enough, hence they became stranded in a two-front-war. He also says that not going through the Netherlands not only created a bottleneck at the German-Belgian border, but also that not having the Dutch railways at their disposal created a huge supply problem, a problem which outweighed the benefits they gained by still having access to the Dutch ports.

The course of the war would have been different if the original concept had been followed. Early in the war, according to the directives of Plan XVII, the French mobilized and hurled their forces towards the German border in an ill-fated attempt to recapture Alsace-Lorraine. This played exactly into Schlieffen's conception of a trap through double envelopment, which called for a loose defense of the border, and actually for retreats by which the French forces would have been lured further away from the main thrust of the German advance. However, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger's weakening of the German right, the defense of Alsace-Lorraine, and the transfer of three army corps and one cavalry division from the western front to help contain the Russian advance into East Prussia, all contributed to the failure of the German army to break through the Allied forces at the Marne. Without that break through, the plan was destroyed.

In essence, Alfred Graf von Schlieffen's audacious plan was never carried out. With the benefit of hindsight, there is evidence that it could have been successful.

Activation, and subsequent failure Debate continues about the merits of the Schlieffen Plan and even on whether the Schlieffen Plan was ever truly executed, ultimately however the German invasion failed for six major reasons:













The failures in the West resulted in defeat at the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914, a stalemate, trench warfare, and a two-front war for Germany.

What eventually occurred was a "reverse Schlieffen", in that Russia was defeated prior to the Western Allies. The Russian army, aided by the Romania and Serbia armies and considered by the German command as more dangerous than the Western Allies, was defeated with relative ease, thanks in no small part to the introduction of Lenin and the Communist revolution to Russia. Meanwhile the Western Allies had a larger manpower base from which to feed the war of attrition taking place. Even though Germany sent many divisions to fight in Italy and the Franco-Benelux theater following the collapse of Russia and the Eastern Front in 1917/18, the Western Allies still defeated the Central Powers' forces. In the 1918 summer campaign Italy obtained a long sought decisive victory over Austria-Hungary, and Austria withdrew from the war exposing Germany's southern flank. The defeat of Bulgaria also exposed Germany (and Austria) to an Allied advance up the Danube. Finally the entrance of the United States on the side of the Allies in 1917, and the arrival of substantial US troops, coupled with the failure of the final German offensives in the West in early 1918, allowed the Allies to push the Germans out of France and into Belgium, towards the German border. Once the long-held static positions were lost, Germany accepted the Allies' armistice terms.

Criticism Several historians argue that the plan was unfeasible for its time, due to the recent advances in weaponry and the improved transportation of industrial warfare. Some would say the plan was "too good". Basil Liddell Hart, for instance, praised the Schlieffen Plan as a conception of Napoleonic boldness, but concluded that:

The plan would again become possible in the next generation—when air power could paralyze the defending side’s attempt to switch its forces, while the development of mechanized forces greatly accelerated the speed of encircling moves, and extended their range. But Schlieffen’s plan had a very poor chance of success at the time it was conceived.

In addition, some historians, including Professor David Fromkin, author of Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? have recently made arguments that what is known as the Schlieffen Plan may not have been an actual plan as such, but instead was laid down in one 1905 hypothetical memorandum and a brief 1906 addition.

Schlieffen may not have intended to be carried out in the form he laid down, instead, seeing it as perhaps an intellectual exercise. Fromkin has argued that, given what historians have recently seen in Schlieffen's papers, captured by the United States Army along with other German war documents after World War One, that the memoranda had never been refined into an operational program. No orders or operational details (such as specific units for each area of the offensive) were appended. He further goes on to pin much of the genesis of the plan as finally enacted on Moltke, who had seen the memorandum and believed it to be a fully-operational plan which he then proceeded to expand upon. Fromkin, in fact, has advocated referring to the "Moltke Plan" as opposed to the "Schlieffen Plan", as it may have been more a product of Moltke's misreading of the Schlieffen Memorandum of 1905 and its 1906 codicil.

According to the historian A. Palmer, however, closer inspection of documents regarding the German war plan reveal that Moltke's changes were not that great, and that the plan was basically flawed from the start. He claims that the Schlieffen plan does not deserve its high reputation, because it underestimated pretty much everyone—the Russians, French, British, and Belgians. However, this would tend to support the view of Professor Fromkin, in that a poor plan would indicate its origin as one not fully vetted.

The British military historian, John Keegan, in summarizing the debate over the plan, criticizes it for its lack of realism about the speed with which the right wing of the German army would be able to wheel through Belgium and the Netherlands in order to arrive outside of Paris on schedule. He observes that, regardless of the path taken, there were simply not enough roads for the masses of troops planned to reach Paris in the time required. In other words, the Plan required German forces to arrive on schedule and in sufficient force, but in reality only one or the other could be achieved, not both.

Keegan also points out to the Schlieffen Plan as a leading example of the separation between military war planning and political/diplomatic considerations which was one of the original causes of the war. Schlieffen conceived his Plan as the best possible solution to a strategic problem, while ignoring the political reality that violating Belgian neutrality was the thing most likely to invite British intervention and expand the conflict.

A factor in evaluating the significance of the Schlieffen plan is the misinformation that was widely disseminated during and after the war. Records were lost and material made up to paint the events in a light more acceptable to those making the decisions at the time.

Another view is also that both Palmer and Fromkin are correct. The Schlieffen plan could have been simply a document that spurred operational thinking and planning, and became the working name for a strategy of bypassing the bulk of the French forces through a flanking maneuver. While the German army of 1914 was not sufficiently mobile for the plan to succeed, only 26 years later the same concept executed with more mobile forces was extremely successful.The German army of 1940 was mostly similarly mobile as the army of 1914, depending on horses for mobility and marching on foot. A major difference was the availability of faster moving armored forces that could be used to effect geographic control while the non-mechanized elements followed, and the availability of aircraft for attack in depth, and close air support missions.

Additional facts

















The difference was that France and England were expecting this tactic and had their forces lined along the French/Belgian Border, with the main thrust to defend its left flank. But Germany had learned from its history as well, and using a mobilized unit (a division of tanks) smashed through the center of the English/French line. This cut the allied forces in two. One was able to escape to England at Dunkirk. The other was quickly defeated, and with it France.

In media In Harry Turtledove's alternate history (fiction) novel, How Few Remain, set in an 1881 in which the Confederate States of America won the American Civil War, Schlieffen is inspired by Robert E. Lee's capture of Philadelphia.

Notes

References



For the French counter-plan, see Plan XVII

The forensic plan was the German General Staff's overall strategic plan for victory both on the Western Front (World War I) against France and against Russia in the east, taking advantage of expected differences in the three countries' speed in preparing for war. It was executed to near victory in the first month of World War I; however, a French counterattack on the outskirts of Paris, the First Battle of the Marne (combined with surprisingly speedy Russian offensives), ended the German offensive and resulted in years of trench warfare. The plan has been the subject of debate among historians and military scholars ever since.

The Schlieffen Plan was created by Alfred Graf von Schlieffen.

The Plan After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the French province of Alsace-Lorraine, with a mixed population of both French and Germans, had been made part of the German Empire. The French Third Republic revanchism vowed to regain the territories they had possessed for nearly 200 years. Due to Bismarck's alliances, France was initially isolated, but after young Kaiser Wilhelm II took over in 1888, he estranged Germany gradually from Russian Empire and United Kingdom, so fears about having to fight a future war on two fronts simultaneously grew among German leaders.

France, having been beaten in a few weeks in 1870, was not considered as dangerous in the long run as the Russian Empire, which was expected to be hard to defeat if the Tsar were allowed the necessary time to mobilize his huge country to full extent. After the Entente Cordiale of 1904 was signed between Britain and France, Kaiser Wilhelm asked Alfred Graf von Schlieffen to devise a plan which would allow Germany to fight a war on two fronts, and in December 1905 von Schlieffen began circulating it.

The idea of the plan was to win a two-front war quickly by first triumphing in the West again before the "Russian Steamroller" would be able to mobilize and descend upon East Prussia—the plan scheduled 39 days for the fall of Paris John Grenville, A History of the World in the 20th Century, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 21. The plan depended on Germany's ability to invade France before France could mobilize its troops to defend itself, and then to turn on Russia, seen as the slowest of the three to mobilize, before the Russians were ready.

It envisioned a rapid German mobilization, disregard of the Neutral country of Luxembourg and Belgium, and an overwhelming sweep of the powerful German right wing southwest through Belgium and Northern France, "letting the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve," Rosinski, Herbert, The German Army, London, Hogarth, 1939 in the words of Schlieffen, while maintaining only a defensive posture on the central and left wings, in Lorraine (région), the Vosges mountains, and the Moselle River.

Paris was not to be taken (the Siege of Paris had lasted for months) but to be passed by the right wing to the west of the city. The intent of the plan was not to conquer cities or industry in order to weaken the French war efforts, but to capture most of the French Army and to force France to surrender, in essence a repeat of the strategy used to defeat France during the Franco-Prussian War. The plan was that the French army would be hemmed in around Paris and forced to fight a decisive envelopment battle.

A seed of disaster lurked in the conception of the plan: both Schlieffen and the man who would eventually implement his Plan, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, were seduced by the possibility of the double envelopment of the entire French Army by the right wing coming from the north and west of France and the left wing coming from the east. The inspiration was the destruction of the Military history of ancient Rome by Hannibal's forces at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, which was the object of meticulous study by Schlieffen. In essence, his plan was a very large scale strategic readdressing of Hannibal's tactics, capitalizing on the recent breakthroughs in communications and transport.

Politically, one of the major drawbacks of the Schlieffen Plan was that it called for the invasion of the neutral states of Belgium and the Netherlands. As it turned out, at least formally, it was the decision to invade Belgium which led to war with Great Britain.

As noted previously, Russian mobilization would supposedly be extremely slow, due to its poor railway system. Following the speedy defeat of France, the German General Staff would switch German concentrations to the Eastern Front (World War I). The plan called for sending 91% of the German troops to France and 9% to Russia. His goal was to defeat France in six weeks, the time it took for Russia to mobilize its army, and turn back to the Eastern Front before Russia could react. Kaiser Wilhelm II is quoted as having said "Paris for lunch, dinner at St. Petersburg."



Modifications to the Plan, 1906 Following the retirement of Schlieffen in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger became the German chief of staff. He disagreed with at least some of the Schlieffen Plan, thinking it to be too risky. The Plan, however, having been devised in 1905, was now too much a part of German military thinking to abandon it completely. All he could do was modify it. Von Moltke decided to pull significant numbers of troops away from the main force entering France from the north, in order to fortify the forces in Alsace-Lorraine, and the forces at the Russian border. The other significant change he made was not to enter through the Netherlands, instead sending troops through Belgium alone. These changes have been the subject of much debate. L.C.F Turner in 1970 described von Moltke's changes as "a substantial modification in the Schlieffen Plan and one which probably doomed the German campaign in the west before it was ever launched." Turner claims that by weakening the main German offensive, they did not have a real chance of defeating the French army quickly enough, hence they became stranded in a two-front-war. He also says that not going through the Netherlands not only created a bottleneck at the German-Belgian border, but also that not having the Dutch railways at their disposal created a huge supply problem, a problem which outweighed the benefits they gained by still having access to the Dutch ports.

The course of the war would have been different if the original concept had been followed. Early in the war, according to the directives of Plan XVII, the French mobilized and hurled their forces towards the German border in an ill-fated attempt to recapture Alsace-Lorraine. This played exactly into Schlieffen's conception of a trap through double envelopment, which called for a loose defense of the border, and actually for retreats by which the French forces would have been lured further away from the main thrust of the German advance. However, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger's weakening of the German right, the defense of Alsace-Lorraine, and the transfer of three army corps and one cavalry division from the western front to help contain the Russian advance into East Prussia, all contributed to the failure of the German army to break through the Allied forces at the Marne. Without that break through, the plan was destroyed.

In essence, Alfred Graf von Schlieffen's audacious plan was never carried out. With the benefit of hindsight, there is evidence that it could have been successful.

Activation, and subsequent failure Debate continues about the merits of the Schlieffen Plan and even on whether the Schlieffen Plan was ever truly executed, ultimately however the German invasion failed for six major reasons:













The failures in the West resulted in defeat at the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914, a stalemate, trench warfare, and a two-front war for Germany.

What eventually occurred was a "reverse Schlieffen", in that Russia was defeated prior to the Western Allies. The Russian army, aided by the Romania and Serbia armies and considered by the German command as more dangerous than the Western Allies, was defeated with relative ease, thanks in no small part to the introduction of Lenin and the Communist revolution to Russia. Meanwhile the Western Allies had a larger manpower base from which to feed the war of attrition taking place. Even though Germany sent many divisions to fight in Italy and the Franco-Benelux theater following the collapse of Russia and the Eastern Front in 1917/18, the Western Allies still defeated the Central Powers' forces. In the 1918 summer campaign Italy obtained a long sought decisive victory over Austria-Hungary, and Austria withdrew from the war exposing Germany's southern flank. The defeat of Bulgaria also exposed Germany (and Austria) to an Allied advance up the Danube. Finally the entrance of the United States on the side of the Allies in 1917, and the arrival of substantial US troops, coupled with the failure of the final German offensives in the West in early 1918, allowed the Allies to push the Germans out of France and into Belgium, towards the German border. Once the long-held static positions were lost, Germany accepted the Allies' armistice terms.

Criticism Several historians argue that the plan was unfeasible for its time, due to the recent advances in weaponry and the improved transportation of industrial warfare. Some would say the plan was "too good". Basil Liddell Hart, for instance, praised the Schlieffen Plan as a conception of Napoleonic boldness, but concluded that:

The plan would again become possible in the next generation—when air power could paralyze the defending side’s attempt to switch its forces, while the development of mechanized forces greatly accelerated the speed of encircling moves, and extended their range. But Schlieffen’s plan had a very poor chance of success at the time it was conceived.

In addition, some historians, including Professor David Fromkin, author of Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? have recently made arguments that what is known as the Schlieffen Plan may not have been an actual plan as such, but instead was laid down in one 1905 hypothetical memorandum and a brief 1906 addition.

Schlieffen may not have intended to be carried out in the form he laid down, instead, seeing it as perhaps an intellectual exercise. Fromkin has argued that, given what historians have recently seen in Schlieffen's papers, captured by the United States Army along with other German war documents after World War One, that the memoranda had never been refined into an operational program. No orders or operational details (such as specific units for each area of the offensive) were appended. He further goes on to pin much of the genesis of the plan as finally enacted on Moltke, who had seen the memorandum and believed it to be a fully-operational plan which he then proceeded to expand upon. Fromkin, in fact, has advocated referring to the "Moltke Plan" as opposed to the "Schlieffen Plan", as it may have been more a product of Moltke's misreading of the Schlieffen Memorandum of 1905 and its 1906 codicil.

According to the historian A. Palmer, however, closer inspection of documents regarding the German war plan reveal that Moltke's changes were not that great, and that the plan was basically flawed from the start. He claims that the Schlieffen plan does not deserve its high reputation, because it underestimated pretty much everyone—the Russians, French, British, and Belgians. However, this would tend to support the view of Professor Fromkin, in that a poor plan would indicate its origin as one not fully vetted.

The British military historian, John Keegan, in summarizing the debate over the plan, criticizes it for its lack of realism about the speed with which the right wing of the German army would be able to wheel through Belgium and the Netherlands in order to arrive outside of Paris on schedule. He observes that, regardless of the path taken, there were simply not enough roads for the masses of troops planned to reach Paris in the time required. In other words, the Plan required German forces to arrive on schedule and in sufficient force, but in reality only one or the other could be achieved, not both.

Keegan also points out to the Schlieffen Plan as a leading example of the separation between military war planning and political/diplomatic considerations which was one of the original causes of the war. Schlieffen conceived his Plan as the best possible solution to a strategic problem, while ignoring the political reality that violating Belgian neutrality was the thing most likely to invite British intervention and expand the conflict.

A factor in evaluating the significance of the Schlieffen plan is the misinformation that was widely disseminated during and after the war. Records were lost and material made up to paint the events in a light more acceptable to those making the decisions at the time.

Another view is also that both Palmer and Fromkin are correct. The Schlieffen plan could have been simply a document that spurred operational thinking and planning, and became the working name for a strategy of bypassing the bulk of the French forces through a flanking maneuver. While the German army of 1914 was not sufficiently mobile for the plan to succeed, only 26 years later the same concept executed with more mobile forces was extremely successful.The German army of 1940 was mostly similarly mobile as the army of 1914, depending on horses for mobility and marching on foot. A major difference was the availability of faster moving armored forces that could be used to effect geographic control while the non-mechanized elements followed, and the availability of aircraft for attack in depth, and close air support missions.

Additional facts

















The difference was that France and England were expecting this tactic and had their forces lined along the French/Belgian Border, with the main thrust to defend its left flank. But Germany had learned from its history as well, and using a mobilized unit (a division of tanks) smashed through the center of the English/French line. This cut the allied forces in two. One was able to escape to England at Dunkirk. The other was quickly defeated, and with it France.

In media In Harry Turtledove's alternate history (fiction) novel, How Few Remain, set in an 1881 in which the Confederate States of America won the American Civil War, Schlieffen is inspired by Robert E. Lee's capture of Philadelphia.

Notes

References



Schlieffen Plan
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Schlieffen Plan - Causes of WWI - World War I - GCSE - SchoolHistory ...
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The Schlieffen Plan was created by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen in December 1905. The Schlieffen Plan was the operational plan for a designated attack on France once Russia ...

Schlieffen Plan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Schlieffen Plan was the German General Staff 's early 20th century overall strategic plan for victory both on the Western Front against France and against Russia in the east ...

Schlieffen Plan
When you have completed the quiz correctly, you will be taken to the suggested links.

Schlieffen Plan (1905)
Schlieffen Plan (1905) ... German plan, evolved in 1905 by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the German General Staff, to deal with a potential two front war against ...

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Using Active Learning, kinaesthetic techniques, to help raise standards in history teaching ... The Failure of the Schlieffen Plan, 1914. Introduction. This lesson was designed by ...

First World War.com - Feature Articles - The Planning of the War
Much is made of the German Schlieffen Plan and, to a lesser extent, the French Plan XVII. But what of Austria-Hungary's Plan B and Russia's Plan 19?

World War I, The Schlieffen Plan
Count Alfred von Schlieffen, who became Chief of the Great General Staff in 1891, submitted his plan in 1905; it was adopted, slightly modified, in 1914.

BBC - GCSE Bitesize - The Schlieffen Plan
A secondary school revision resource for GCSE History ... Revision tip and answer preparation Revision tip. Copy or print this map:

 

Schlieffen Plan



 
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